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When we least expect it, life sets us a challenge to test our courage and willingness to change; at 
such a moment, there is no point in pretending that nothing has happened or in saying that we are 
not yet ready. The challenge will not wait. Life does not look back. 
—Paulo Coelho, The Devil and Miss Prym 
 
New Orleans’ nickname “Big Easy” was based on the “anything goes” perception of the city. 
Feeding this perception was a sense of lawlessness, that New Orleans was a place where the rules 
changed depending on who you were and who you knew. So when Hurricane Katrina hit the city 
in August 2005 and tossed everything around—flooding mansions and missions, damaging the 
Superdome and supermarkets—the storm challenged old perceptions and presented unique 
challenges. Katrina made at least one thing clear: New Orleans could no longer wait for change, 
pretend nothing happened, or look back. The city’s survival depended on its ability to move 
forward. 
One of the greatest challenges to New Orleans’ ability to move forward was its criminal legal 
system, especially the public defense system. For decades before Katrina, the public defense 
system in New Orleans—like others throughout Louisiana—was “plagued by negligent attorneys 
who provide[d] haphazard and deficient representation.” Orleans Parish Prison, for example, was 
packed with more than six thousand people, most of whom had no representation once Katrina 
hit.1 Fragile and underfunded, the New Orleans public defense system lacked the ability to even 
try to respond to the crisis of Katrina. All but four staff members were terminated immediately 
after the storm. Like most social institutions in New Orleans, however, public defense in New 
Orleans had been targeted for reform multiple times before Katrina, with few positive results. 
Katrina was uniquely devastating, producing a national outcry and causing local 
embarrassment. Now palpably visible, the unjust status quo was deemed unacceptable. At the time, 
I and a group of like-minded leaders stood ready with time, passion, and capacity to seize the 
moment to effect reform. While opposition to reform remained alive, it was critically wounded, as 
millions in and outside New Orleans could see how the system they had supported and defended 
all these years had failed. With reform opponents weakened by the storm, New Orleans started 
accepting changes to its public defender system. 
I begin this article with a brief history of public defense in New Orleans, outlining the well-
documented injustices and dysfunction plaguing public defense before and immediately after 
Katrina and describing the efforts that were made to cure the ills of the system. I then discuss the 
efforts by reformers in the years after Katrina to create a more just, fair, and equitable public 
defense system. In the final section I discuss outcomes and the lessons learned from the efforts to 
transform public defense in New Orleans and the challenges that remain as the struggle for equity 
and fairness in our public defense system continues. 
 
Derwyn Bunton is a national leader and advocate for public defense and equal justice. He is chief public defender for 
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Before becoming chief, he was a civil rights litigator and executive director for what is 
now the Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights, the nation’s first stand-alone juvenile defense provider. 
 New England Journal of Public Policy 
2 
 
Public Defense Pre-Katrina: History, Structure, and Struggle 
History 
Nearly 250 years ago, a civil disturbance broke out in a territory on the verge of revolution. An 
unjust monarch maintained an occupying force of soldiers, and in late March 1770, eight of these 
soldiers fired on civilians, killing five and wounding six others. The territorial government returned 
indictments for murder, and the penalty for conviction was death. After several attempts, the 
soldiers—unpopular and poor—could find only one lawyer to handle their case. That lawyer 
represented the soldiers and their captain and achieved acquittals for all but two of the soldiers, 
who were found guilty of lesser offenses. All escaped the death penalty. 
The civil disturbance became known as the Boston Massacre. Six years later, that territory 
declared its independence, and the United States of America was born. That lawyer who 
represented the unpopular and abandoned soldiers free of charge (or at least at a price too small 
for history to remember) went on to become the second president of the United States, John 
Adams—perhaps the first great public defender. 
The principle that no person accused of a crime should face the government without counsel 
is an American value that predates our republic. 
The right to counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
part of the Bill of Rights, adopted in 1789. It is one of the original ten amendments, forming the 
foundation of the United States. It reads, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” The right to counsel was initially interpreted 
to mean that those who wished to have counsel, and who were able to afford counsel, would not 
be denied the right to have representation in criminal cases in both state and federal court.2 
The United States Supreme Court, however, did not order states to provide counsel for the 
poor facing criminal prosecution until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution in 1868.3 The Fourteenth Amendment made the US Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states—but not all at once. The Supreme Court systematically, gradually, and selectively made the 
Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright.4 This case made the Sixth 
Amendment applicable to the states, guaranteeing poor people counsel in criminal cases. In 
Gideon, the Supreme Court wrote: “The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”5 Robert F. 
Kennedy remarked: “If an obscure Florida convict named Clarence Earl Gideon had not sat down 
in his prison cell . . . to write a letter to the Supreme Court . . . the vast machinery of American law 
would have gone on functioning undisturbed. But Gideon did write that letter, the Court did look 
into his case . . . and the whole course of American legal history has been changed.”6 Gideon is 
the seminal case on the right to counsel in the United States. It is the reason we have public 
defenders representing poor people around the country. 
 
Structure  
In 1966, in response to Gideon, Louisiana created indigent defender boards, divided into forty-one 
judicial districts. Under local control and funded by court fines and fees paid by people accused of 
crime (largely traffic tickets), these boards (known as IDBs) were tasked with providing competent 
counsel for people too poor to afford a lawyer on their own.7 In 1974, the right to counsel was 
codified in the new Louisiana state constitution, recognizing the right to counsel and other rights 
of men and women accused in criminal proceedings. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 specifies: 
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“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating qualified 
counsel for indigents.”8 
Louisiana’s statewide user-pay public defender funding scheme is unique in the United States. 
Louisiana’s entire criminal legal system depends on fines and fees generated by (or at least 
assessed against) poor people moving through the system. In the beginning these fines and fees 
were the sole source of revenue for public defender offices around the state. Every other part of 
the criminal legal system received supplemental funds directly from the state or local government 
or both. It took the Louisiana State Legislature twenty years after ratification of the 1974 
Constitution to provide supplemental state funding to public defense—at a woefully low level.9 
Before Katrina, the IDB in New Orleans was known as the Orleans Indigent Defender 
Program or OIDP. At the time Katrina hit New Orleans, it was an office that comprised between 
forty and fifty contract, part-time attorneys handling a large percentage of the new criminal cases 
moving through the New Orleans criminal justice system—more than a hundred thousand cases in 
2004. If the lawyers handled only half the workload, it meant a caseload average of a thousand 
new cases per lawyer—part-time. Such caseloads were excessive by any measure.10 For a couple 
of decades before Katrina, the OIDP and the entire state public defender system received constant 
and consistent national criticism.11  
 
Struggle  
The Louisiana and New Orleans public defender system was targeted for reform many times by 
social justice advocates and frontline public defenders.12 One of the most heavily publicized efforts 
to reform public defense in Louisiana and New Orleans occurred in the early 1990s. An 
overworked and underresourced public defender, Rick Tessier, appeared in court, stood up, and 
told Judge Calvin Johnson of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court he was unable to proceed. 
Tessier asserted that he was ineffective at the outset and to move forward would deprive all his 
clients of their Sixth Amendment rights. Judge Johnson halted proceedings and ordered hearings 
and briefings to determine whether the public defender system was structurally ineffective. After 
testimony from multiple practitioners and experts, Judge Johnson found Tessier and the public 
defender system unconstitutional at its inception. The district attorney appealed and the case was 
ultimately decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court.13 In State v. Leonard Peart, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court declined to provide any systemic relief, finding instead that public defender 
services in that section of court were unconstitutional because of excessive workloads.14 So the 
disparities and ineffectiveness continued from district to district and section to section.15 
Peart was emblematic of the challenges public defense reform advocates faced before Katrina. 
Decision makers were reluctant to make systemic change—what some organizers call a fear of too 
much justice—while at the same time pretending the unfairness, inequity, and injustice either did 
not exist or was confined, contained, or episodic. Reformers, however, were steadfast. Efforts were 
launched in the courts and in the legislature to improve public defense in New Orleans and 
throughout Louisiana. Each shortfall, half win, and failure drew more intellectual capital to the 
cause and gave advocates experience. The various efforts also provided hope as we saw 
incremental improvements in structure.16  
Through it all, OIDP lawyers fought hard, but even the most skilled were fighting with their 
hands tied. Structurally, the OIDP provided little more than speed bumps on the way to jail and 
prison for the poor and overwhelmingly African American clients moving through the system. 
Because a person in jail was not considered a case until the district attorney decided to accept the 
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case, often a person who could not afford a lawyer sat in jail after an arrest for more than two 
months before he or she was sent to a courtroom and assigned a public defender.17 
Part-time lawyers were assigned to courtrooms rather than clients. The terrible incentives 
created by this system were threefold. First, the system caused lawyers to care more about 
pleasing—or at least not angering—judges than clients. Second, lawyers prioritized completing 
the day’s court docket over worrying about clients’ substantive cases. Third, because OIDP 
lawyers were part-time (and poorly paid), more attention was given to their private—paying—
clients. 
The OIDP had no meaningful investigative resources, no organized training, and no money 
for experts or adequate administrative support. The chief source of OIDP income was traffic 
tickets—the nation’s only statewide user-pay criminal justice system. OIDP attorneys were forced 
by oppressive caseloads and poor funding to brutally triage cases, making quick decisions about 
which cases were worth fighting. Innocent clients pleaded guilty rather than face charges 
represented by an understaffed and underresourced public defender. Because of this history, before 
Katrina, Louisiana became a national leader in exonerations and incarceration.18 The Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, in its 2006 report on the OIDP, confirmed the problems 
of the New Orleans court-centered, resource-starved public defense system: “There appeared to be 
little accountability within the office. There were no client files or any other records or data, save 
a monthly tabulation of cases closed and how they were closed (e.g., trial, plea, dismissal). There 
is no phone number for the office, and clients cannot come to the office. We were told that attorney 
evaluations seem to be passive, based on judicial satisfaction with the attorneys assigned to their 
court. There is no supervisory evaluation of public defenders on such core skills as communication 
with clients, recognition of legal issues, or trial preparation.”19 
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association also assessed public defense in New 
Orleans after the storm. It too found that public defense in New Orleans before Katrina was 
probably systemically unconstitutional. The report reads: “Pre-Katrina, the public defense system 
in New Orleans was not obligated to adhere to any national, state or local standards of justice 
resulting in public defenders handling too many cases, with insufficient support staff, practically 
no training or supervision, experiencing undue interference from the judiciary, all the while 
compromising their practices by working part-time in private practices to augment their inadequate 
compensation.”20 
 
Public Defense Post-Katrina: Reform, New Structure . . . and Struggle 
When thousands of men and women in orange jumpsuits were forced by the flood waters of Katrina 
to find safety on an overpass under the New Orleans sun, their massive numbers provided vivid 
evidence of decades of overincarceration, failed criminal justice policies, and cumulative 
injustice. The columnist David Brooks put it this way: “[Hurricane Katrina] wash[ed] away the 
surface of [New Orleans] society, [and] expose[d] the underlying power structures, the injustices, 
the patterns of corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities.”21 Public defense in New Orleans 
was one of these exposed injustices and unacknowledged inequalities. Still, advocates in New 
Orleans who dreamed of a better and more just city saw in post-Katrina New Orleans an 
opportunity to rebuild the criminal legal system with justice and fairness as its cornerstones. 
Critical to any fair and just criminal legal system is public defense. 
 
 




The pre-Katrina struggles in New Orleans built an infrastructure of reformers and developed 
intellectual capital to move public defense forward. Thus, in the aftermath of the storm, with the 
New Orleans criminal legal system in full collapse, I and other reformers began to work for 
change.22  
We met in Springfield, Louisiana, on May 10 and 11, 2006, to discuss the crisis in public 
defense. We all agreed that reform was long overdue and that funding and structural reform were 
necessary.23 Also at that meeting was Ronald Sullivan, a Yale Law School professor and former 
director of the District of Columbia public defender program whose knowledge about best practice 
for public defense left us with a vision, renewed hope, and sense of purpose. 
A month earlier, Chief Judge Calvin Johnson (the judge responsible for the Peart decision) 
persuaded the local IDB members to resign and appointed an entirely new board, tasked with 
reforming the system.24 I was part of that new board. We hired Sullivan to help organize the 
reformed OIDP and launched a state reform effort, using the debacle caused by Katrina as a reason 
to reform the structure of public defense. Among the many leaders of this effort was the Louisiana 
State Bar Association president, Frank Neuner, who played a major role. 
 
Structure and Struggle 
OIDP was reborn as the Orleans Public Defenders Office (OPD). With a budget of $2.8 million in 
federal relief funds, the new board set about remaking public defense in New Orleans. The Bureau 
of Justice Assistance report asserted, however, that real reform would cost millions more.25 Under 
Sullivan’s direction, we mandated attorneys to work full-time on behalf of poor people in New 
Orleans. We added Jon Rapping, the former training director for public defender programs, to train 
a new class of attorneys.26 We also mandated lawyers be assigned to clients—not courtrooms—
based on levels of experience and competence. It was a seismic cultural shift. It drew a seismic 
response. 
The post-Katrina confrontations between OPD and the old guard were extraordinary. Many 
in the criminal legal system simply wanted their old system back. The Orleans Parish District 
Attorney even charged an OPD investigator with kidnapping for daring to interview a young 
witness in the course of her investigation.27 This was a response to professional defense 
investigation—routine in other jurisdictions but foreign (and therefore illegal) in New Orleans. 
The charges were later dropped. 
Opponents to reform seemed to be as numerous as proponents. Perhaps most formidable 
among the opponents were Criminal District Court judges, most of whom either very publicly 
attacked the board or remained silent while others did.28 The chief tool used to try to rein in our 
independent board: contempt. Acting individually and as a group, Criminal District Court judges 
routinely found our new independent board and lawyers in contempt.29 After demanding to remain 
present with the lawyer he supervised and the client OPD represented, Stephen Singer, the OPD 
chief of trials, was placed in a compliance hold and dragged out of the courtroom by deputies—
after the court’s order of contempt.30 Before Katrina, the criminal bench exercised significant 
control over the OIDP board, selecting members who catered to the wishes of the judges rather 
those of the clients. After Katrina, with the appointment of an independent board, the judges 
resisted the loss of control and, without more structural reform, attempted to regain control as soon 
as Judge Johnson’s term as chief judge expired. We responded by filing suit in federal court in 
May 2007.31 
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Deeper structural change was brewing, though. In the 2007 legislative session, legislation designed 
to change the structure of public defense statewide was making its way through the Louisiana State 
Legislature. HB 436, sponsored by Representative Daniel Martiny, aimed to create a more 
independent state board with more authority (and more funding) to regulate public defense 
practice. Important to us, if passed, the legislation would immediately eliminate local IDBs, 
consolidating their power in the position of chief district defender. The chief defender in place at 
the time of passage would assume the powers of the IDB, and in the future, the chief district 
defender would be chosen by the newly created Louisiana Public Defender Board—reasonably 
immune to and independent of the local judiciary and political pressures.32 
In August 2007, the Louisiana Public Defender Act (Act 307) became law, and Christine 
Lehman assumed the role of chief defender. A new public defender office, chosen by the reform-
oriented board, was now all but guaranteed. Act 307 eliminated the IDBs, mooted our lawsuit, and 
remade the structure of public defense in Louisiana and New Orleans—for the better. Act 307 
created a new Louisiana Public Defender Board, which required membership from diverse 
constituencies, eliminated local boards, set standards for practice, and removed judges from the 
decision-making process regarding type of service delivery or selection of the chief defender.33 It 
also gave more money to public defense and gave the Public Defender Board the ability to hold 
districts accountable for how they deliver public defense services in Louisiana. 
 
Public Defense Pre-Katrina: Outcomes, Lessons, and the Road Ahead 
Outcomes  
When the dust settled, OPD emerged as an independent, client-centered, full-time public defender 
office with better training and more resources. New, progressive public defender leaders created 
an office more capable of living up to the promise of Gideon, granting all of us the right to effective 
counsel. In Gideon, the US Supreme Court states that public defenders are fundamental to the 
existence of justice in our criminal courts: “The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”34 
Obstacles and challenges continue, however, to prevent our criminal legal system from achieving 
fairness, justice, and equity. 
Fourteen years after Katrina, OPD remains underresourced and understaffed. The state 
reforms of 2007, while laudable, failed to change the structure of our user-pay criminal legal 
system. Hard-fought structural and policy reforms can be fully realized only with adequate funding 
and resources, and the system in place today is inadequate, unreliable, and unstable.35 For example, 
OPD is currently restricting public defender services for the fourth time in fourteen years.36 Thus, 
we have poor people waitlisted for an attorney and staff laid off or put on furlough; we lack 
investigative and expert funds, and funding for conflict case representation is inadequate. These 
issues are largely products of Louisiana’s user-pay criminal legal system. Fueling the criminal 
legal system on fines, fees, and costs from poor people caught in the system yields inadequate, 
unpredictable, and unreliable revenues, rendering public defenders incapable of providing 
professional, ethical, constitutional representation for the poor.37 More work is needed to ensure 
that Gideon and the reforms of the past fourteen years are not hollow. To that end, OPD strives to 
live up to its responsibilities in our criminal legal system: defend innocence, fight for clients, and 
hold power accountable. 
 
 




Despite great disparities between the funding and resources for our office and those for other 
criminal justice agencies, public defense in New Orleans is exponentially better than it was before 
Katrina. OPD is now a local partner in managing jail population, increasing public confidence in 
the criminal legal system, reducing wrongful convictions, maintaining system accountability, and 
ensuring that justice is done. OPD attracts national recognition for its strength, tenacity, and 
commitment to excellent representation. For example, OPD won the Southern Center for Human 
Rights, Frederick Douglass Human Rights Award in 2009.38 In bestowing that award, the same 
organization that had deemed public defense in New Orleans an unconstitutional disaster (even 
before Katrina) now recognized OPD as a champion of civil and human rights. Among the most 
prestigious honors OPD received was the 2015 American Bar Association/National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association, Clara Shortridge Foltz Award.39 As it had for the Frederick Douglass award, 
OPD, declared one of the best public defenders in the nation, earned praise from an early critic.40  
The New Orleans community respects and supports OPD, recognizing that justice for poor 
people means something and requires a champion to make it mean something. OPD has little in 
common with the old OIDP. Evidence of OPD’s acceptance within the community as a champion 
of justice for poor people came on December 16, 2014, when, more than 250 people answered our 
call to protest the 2004 shooting death of Michael Brown Jr. in Ferguson, Missouri, and other 
police shootings.41 Our community stood with us to highlight the injustices seen every day in New 
Orleans criminal courts and our willingness to bear witness and fight. We essentially emptied the 
courthouse for this demonstration, and no one was held in or even threatened with contempt. 
Community recognition and support is also evidenced by the number of people who show up each 
year for OPD’s Second Line for Equal Justice.42 
 
The Road Ahead  
Hurricane Katrina split all our lives into before and after. Katrina challenged us to not just survive 
but change. Fourteen years later, OPD is now evidence of how the most entrenched and 
intransigent places can reform. For the moment, however, that work is incomplete. For the reform 
effort to continue, stakeholders and decision makers must make structural changes to our user-pay 
system. The fight for public defense reform provides a blueprint. I am in my tenth year as chief 
defender for Orleans Parish, but I have worked on behalf of the poor and vulnerable all my 
professional life—more than twenty years. This journey of public defense reform has taught me 
some important lessons. 
Remember your failures and who failed with you. Those same people, if committed, will be 
around when the time is right and change is most needed. They are the intellectual (and physical) 
muscle needed to make change a reality—the people learning the same tough lessons from 
previous efforts. For example, the chair of the reform-minded board put together by Judge Johnson 
was Denise LeBoeuf, a superb lawyer and veteran of many legal and legislative battles fought in 
the effort to change how the criminal legal system in Louisiana operates.43 
Find the opportunity in every moment. Katrina was devastating. It forced me to move to 
Shreveport, Louisiana, after short stints in Tennessee and Texas. Maintaining a reform mindset 
was critical to my not giving up on New Orleans. Katrina forced humility on our community that 
sowed the seeds for change. But just as easily we might have given into destructive despair. 
Recruit new allies. Particularly after Katrina, as we endeavored to strengthen and build on 
reform, new stakeholders joined in the call for reform. But reform really started in those moments 
after the storm and in the new local board. The new reform board members were partners from 
 New England Journal of Public Policy 
8 
 
prestigious firms: Harry Rosenberg and Kim Boyle from Phelps Dunbar, and Phil Wittmann from 
Stone Pigman Walther and Wittmann. The education each of these new board members received 
turned them into advocates for change in their respective communities. 
Continue to educate yourself and others on the issues. Information is powerful. Our reform 
was armed with reports and a history of litigation and legislative efforts that helped us persuade 
stakeholders that change was necessary and urgent. Knowing the history and having all the facts 
allowed us to point to third-party opinion and research to prove we were on the right side of history 
and the issues. 
Media work and strategy are powerful tools. The incredible work done by journalists over the 
past decade and a half has been invaluable in educating stakeholders, decision makers, and the 
public. The work of the media highlighting the problems of real people in the criminal legal system, 
publicly calling out unfairness, and exposing years of neglect prompted people to pay attention 
and demand action. 
Our reform successes and failures in post-Katrina New Orleans make it impossible to pretend 
that nothing happened or that nothing can be done. Katrina taught us that the stakes are too high 
to say we are not ready. Our reform journey continues. 
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